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The abstention of the conservative-liberal government under Chancellor
Angela Merkel on UN Security Council resolution 1973 marked the first
occasion in which the Federal Republic of Germany stood against all
three of its main Western partners, the US, France, and the UK, simulta-
neously, on a major foreign policy issue. Many accounts of this decision
invoke the influence of electoral incentives. What is problematic, how-
ever, is that the causal weight attached to electoral politics is often left
ambiguous and difficult to assess with traditional case study methods.
The article, therefore, employs counterfactual reasoning to scrutinize
“electoral politics” explanations of Germany’s policy on Libya. Specifi-
cally, it develops counterfactuals in which decision making did not take
place in the shadow of upcoming elections and investigates how other
variables on different levels of analysis would have shaped decision mak-
ing in the counterfactual scenarios. The findings suggest that electoral
incentives did not decisively shift German foreign policy on Libya. More
generally, the article speaks to the value of counterfactuals in foreign
policy analysis.
Government decisions for or against participating in multilateral military mis-
sions are the focal point of a broader debate on change and continuity in Ger-
man foreign policy since unification. On the one hand, the reluctance of
German decision makers to commit to the use of military force has been seen as
confirmation of the civilian power role concept (Harnisch 2001; Maull 2001; Ris-
se 2004) and the continued relevance of the Federal Republic’s culture of mili-
tary restraint (Berger 2002; Longhurst 2004; Malici 2006). On the other hand,
post-unification Germany’s enhanced role in multilateral military interventions is
given as evidence for the “normalization” of German foreign policy which is
being portrayed as evermore power-conscious, assertive, and self-confident
(Sch€ollgen 2000; Wagener 2004; Hellmann, Weber, and Sauer 2007). Thus, dif-
ferences in the assessment of Germany’s record in contributing to international
1Authors’ notes: An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2013 Annual Convention of the Interna-
tional Studies Association in San Francisco. We thank Gerry C. Alons and Klaus Brummer as well as the anonymous
reviewers and journal editors at Foreign Policy Analysis for their comments and suggestions.
Hansel Mischa, Oppermann Kai. (2014) Counterfactual Reasoning in Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of German
Nonparticipation in the Libya Intervention of 2011. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/fpa.12054
© 2014 International Studies Association
Foreign Policy Analysis (2014), 0, 1–19
military missions are very much at the core of current controversies about the
overall trajectory of German foreign policy.
This is true, in particular, for one of the highest profile cases of post-unifica-
tion Germany’s nonparticipation in military interventions of its Western allies,
the 2011 NATO mission “Unified Protector” in Libya. The abstention of the con-
servative-liberal government under Chancellor Angela Merkel on UN Security
Council resolution 1973 which authorized member states to “take all necessary
measures” to protect civilians from the Gaddafi regime in Libya was likened to a
“stab in the back” (Ash 2011) of Germany’s allies and marked the first occasion
since World War II in which Germany stood against all three of its main Western
partners, the US, France, and the UK, simultaneously, on a major foreign policy
issue. This unprecedented isolation of Germany on a major security issue was
seen to revive “fears of Germany reverting to a semineutral stay-at-home strategy
that could undermine the alliance” (Peel 2011), and the former German foreign
minister Joschka Fischer was merely one of the most outspoken of many voices
in the German debate when he ranked the government stance as “possibly the
biggest foreign policy debacle since the founding of the Federal Republic” (Fi-
scher 2011:26).
At the same time, there is no scholarly consensus about the main driving
forces behind this highly controversial decision. The reasons advanced for the
Merkel government’s policy of abstention include the reduced weight given to
considerations of alliance solidarity in the definition of the German national
interest (Hellmann 2011:20–22; Miskimmon 2012); the changing national role
conceptions of German decision makers (Oppermann 2012); a geopolitical re-
orientation of Germany toward the emerging powers (Stephens 2011); the inex-
perience of foreign minister Guido Westerwelle and government miscalculations
regarding, for example, the position of the Obama administration (Rinke 2011;
Miskimmon 2012:398).
Many accounts of German decision making on Libya, moreover, seek to rein-
force their causal narrative by implicit or explicit references to the domestic elec-
toral interests of the liberal junior coalition partner, the FDP, in view of two
forthcoming regional elections on 27 March 2011 (Bertram 2011; Hacke
2011:52; Maull 2011:112–113; R€uhl 2011:565). Given polling evidence of wide-
spread public opposition to any German participation in a military intervention
in Libya (Oppermann 2012:515), the argument put forward is that the liberals
and foreign minister Guido Westerwelle, in particular, tried to emulate the red-
green government’s 2002 electoral strategy and to turn around their domestic
political fortunes by adopting a high-profile anti-war stance:
The abstention on UN1973 was partly an FDP electoral tactic in light of the
upcoming state elections in Baden-W€urttemberg on 27 March 2011. With
concerns that the FDP might not pass the 5 per cent threshold, Westerwelle
calculated that an abstention would prove helpful. (Miskimmon 2012:399)
This tendency to “fortify” causal arguments about Germany’s opposition to the
military intervention in Libya by bringing in the electoral interests of the FDP,
however, is unsatisfactory in two respects. First, the causal weight attached to the
‘electoral politics’ argument remains ambiguous. While the implicit assumption
clearly is that German policy on Libya would have been different had it not been
for the electoral interests of the junior coalition partner, how and to what effect
these interests are said to have impacted on decision making is rarely spelled
out. Rather, the “electoral politics” argument tends to be put alongside other
explanatory factors, which are equally hypothesized as having caused Germany’s
abstention on UN1973. This, in turn, leads to an account of the decision in
which the causal effects of different factors are impossible to disentangle (Ragin
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2000:88–119). Second, the plausibility of the “electoral politics” argument solely
rests on the congruence between the electoral interests of the Merkel govern-
ment, in particular of the liberal junior partner, and the expected electoral
repercussions of opposing mission “Unified Protector.” In other words, the
assumption is that government policy must have been driven by electoral incen-
tives, simply because these incentives appeared to suggest the policy that the gov-
ernment has selected. While this argument is inherently unfalsifiable, little effort
has been made to show that electoral considerations have indeed played a role
in government decision making.
Against this background, the objective is to probe into the difference “elec-
toral politics” has or has not made to German foreign policy on Libya. The arti-
cle does therefore not aim at testing different theoretical explanations for
German nonparticipation. More modestly, it seeks to clarify the causal weight of
one of the most often invoked single variables in such explanations (King, Keo-
hane, and Verba 1994:119–121). This is relevant, first, because it contributes to a
clearer analysis of the relevant drivers behind government decision making on
Libya and thereby lays the ground for more comprehensive assessments of com-
peting theoretical accounts of this decision. From a political perspective, second,
it is crucial for any judgments on the sincerity or otherwise of the German gov-
ernment. Specifically, the ambition is to investigate whether the apparent con-
gruence between electoral incentives and German foreign policy does indeed
indicate a causal relationship between the two variables (George and Bennett
2005:181–192).
Traditional methods of tracing the factual decision-making process, however,
are not well-placed to yield insights on possible causal pathways from electoral
considerations to government policy, not the least because documents and
accounts of decision makers are unlikely to reveal evidence for possible strategic
electoral motives behind foreign policy decisions that would contradict the offi-
cial government discourse. The article, therefore, takes up the methodological
advice (George and Bennett 2005:184) to employ a counterfactual analysis as an
alternative means to test the plausibility of imputing a causal link between elec-
toral incentives and German foreign policy on Libya. More precisely, the
research strategy is to construct two counterfactuals in which government policy
on the issue is not formulated in the context of domestic electoral competition
and to trace whether and how this manipulation of the antecedent brings about
changes in the consequent, that is, Germany’s approach to a military interven-
tion in Libya. This makes it possible to isolate the effects of electoral interest on
government decision making and to scrutinize the explanatory power of the
“electoral politics” argument.
The next section will introduce the method of counterfactual reasoning and
discuss our counterfactuals in light of established methodological standards. The
subsequent section will investigate how German foreign policy on Libya would
likely have unfolded in the counterfactual condition. The conclusion will wrap
up our argument about the role of electoral politics for Germany’s opposition to
mission “Unified Protector.”
Theoretical and Methodological Considerations
Counterfactuals can be understood as “subjunctive conditional[s] in which the
antecedent is known or supposed for purposes of argument to be false” (Levy
2008:629). Even though a growing number of historians and IR scholars make
use of counterfactuals (for recent examples see Harvey 2012; Lebow 2010; Go-
ertz and Levy 2007; Ferguson 1999), it is still a highly disputed scientific method.
Critics contend that there is no way of systematically doing research about events
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which did not happen (Taylor 1954:513; Fischer 1970:15–21) – and that counter-
factual reasoning is thus a fruitless and unscientific business.
Types of Counterfactuals and Criteria for Assessing their Quality
Such criticism can be responded to on three grounds. First, the differences
between factual and counterfactual worlds are far from being as clear-cut as the
critics suggest. Every statement on cause-effect relationships by necessity entails
an often implicit counterfactual argument (Tetlock and Belkin 1996:5; Levy
2008:629; Lebow 2010:30–37; Harvey 2012:23–24, 37). As a consequence, avoid-
ing counterfactuals altogether is hardly a viable option:
Whenever we make the apparently factual claim that factor X made a critical cau-
sal contribution to outcome Y, we simultaneously make a critical counterfactual
claim that, in a logical shadow universe with factor X deleted, outcome Y would
not have occurred. (Tetlock, Lebow, and Parker 2007:18)
If, for instance, we think that neo-conservatives in the Bush administration
were ultimately responsible for the 2003 Iraq War, we simultaneously assume that
a hypothetical Gore administration with a different ideological outlook would
have followed another course (Harvey 2012). Only if we eschew all causal infer-
ence and confine ourselves to purely descriptive analysis would we be able to
abstain from counterfactual reasoning (Wenzlhuemer 2009:32). Thus, rather
than questioning counterfactual thinking per se, we should attend to what can
be seen as appropriate standards for judging the quality of specific counterfactu-
al arguments (Fearon 1991:170).
Second, few if any counterfactuals condone ungrounded speculations on alter-
native courses of history. While it is true that counterfactuals are sometimes used
to demonstrate the contingency and nonlinearity of the social world (see Lebow
2010), this can still be done in a systematic and inter-subjectively understandable
way. So-called ideographic counterfactuals (Levy 2008:631) use in-depth case-specific
knowledge on the motives, beliefs, and constraints of decision makers in an
effort to explore, for example, whether the Russian revolution was indeed inevi-
table after the defeat of the Czarist armies in World War I (Tetlock and Belkin
1996:7). The objective, to paraphrase Harvey (2012:37), is to scrutinize standard
accounts of historic events and processes. This is being done by shedding light
on empirical evidence that is sidestepped or ignored by conventional approaches
(Harvey 2012:37). In the case of Harvey’s analysis of US policy on Iraq, such evi-
dence comprises, among other things, the worldviews of Al Gore and his politi-
cal advisers which would likely have played a leading role in the foreign policy
decision making of a counterfactual Gore presidency.
Other types of counterfactuals, however, serve completely different purposes.
“Miracle world counterfactuals” (Lebow 2010:44) might, for instance, reveal
unspoken assumptions and hidden value judgments behind political worldviews
(Tetlock and Belkin 1996:13–14; Wenzlhuemer 2009:44–46) without any claim to
historical plausibility. Lebow (2010:44) provides an illustration of this kind of
counterfactual argument when he puts the question what the international com-
munity would have done in South Sudan if it had been inhabited by a Caucasian
rather than black population.
Still another use of counterfactuals relates to the traditional tasks of evaluating
and testing general theoretical claims. Nomothetic counterfactuals (Levy 2008:631)
specify “observable implications” of general propositions (King et al. 1994:28–29,
109–112) and guide the search for “corroborative correlational evidence”
(Tetlock and Belkin 1996:10). As a case in point, the democratic peace thesis
logically implies the absence of war in a counterfactual international system that
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is made up only of democratic states. For this to be valid, in turn, we should
expect to find some corroborative evidence in the factual world. For example,
the political memoirs of democratic leaders should more often refer to political
constraints on war-fighting than their authoritarian counterparts (Tetlock and
Belkin 1996:10).
A third response to the critics of counterfactuals, moreover, would challenge
the assumption (Fischer 1970:19) that every counterfactual is equally hypotheti-
cal. Specifically, the methodological literature suggests a number of criteria for
assessing and comparing the quality and usefulness of counterfactual claims
(Tetlock and Belkin 1996:16–31; Levy 2008:632–540; Lebow 2010:54–57).2 For
one thing, antecedents and consequents need to be well specified, that is, they
must meet the criterion of clarity (Levy 2008:632; Lebow 2010:54).
Another criterion “requires that if the counterfactual assertion had been true
[…] nothing else would also have been different in a way that would have materi-
ally affected the outcome” (Fearon 1991:195; see also Goodman 1973:9–17). This
is closely related to the more general “minimum rewrite of history rule” (Tetlock
and Belkin 1996:23) which tells us to avoid major interventions in the course of
factual history. The methodological problem involved here resembles the difficul-
ties in experimental settings or comparative case-studies of holding third variables
constant. While “surgical counterfactuals” are certainly unrealistic (Lebow
2010:50), ripple effects from counterfactual manipulations and other interactions
between variables should be made explicit and minimized as much as possible.
Still another criterion holds that counterfactual arguments should not contra-
dict well-established theoretical and statistical generalizations (Tetlock and Bel-
kin 1996:25–30). Since there are few such regularities and theoretical
generalizations in IR, however, this benchmark appears problematic in our disci-
pline and should not be overemphasized. Last but not least, counterfactuals have
been assessed against the principle of projectability (Tetlock and Belkin 1996:30–
31), that is they are expected to tease out as many observable implications of the
connecting principles as possible which can be corroborated by empirical
evidence.
Constructing Comparative Counterfactuals about Germany’s Policy on Libya
Recall that the purpose of our exercise in counterfactual reasoning is to evaluate
the explanatory power of “electoral politics” arguments for Germany’s policy on
Libya in 2011. This most closely resembles the rationale for ideographic counterfac-
tuals. Methodologically, our research objectives require us to assess the relative
strengths and weaknesses of two competing counterfactual claims:
Counterfactual A: If there had not been upcoming state-level elections, the Merkel govern-
ment would have voted for Resolution 1973 and would have participated in mission “Uni-
fied Protector” in Libya.
Counterfactual B: If there had not been upcoming state-level elections, the Merkel govern-
ment would still have abstained on Resolution 1973 and would still not have participated in
mission “Unified Protector” in Libya.
This method has been introduced as comparative counterfactual analysis
(CCA) by Harvey (2012). It is based on the insight that “the quality of a
counterfactual claim cannot be evaluated in isolation” (Harvey 2012:34)
2 It should be noted that there are counterfactuals for which these criteria do not apply, because they serve
other purposes than theory-testing or explanation. The best cases in point are so-called “miracle world counterfac-
tuals” (Lebow 2010:44–46).
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because the strengths of one version of history automatically reveal weaknesses
of the other. Accordingly, any analysis that considers only one counterfactual
without taking into account the plausibility of its mirror image runs the risk
of being incomplete and biased in favor of preferred readings of history (Har-
vey 2012:34–35).
Given this set-up, how useful are our counterfactuals and how do they score
on the criteria discussed above? As regards the demand for clarity, we contend
that the antecedent and consequent are indeed unambiguously defined. Second,
we are confident that the counterfactuals meet the criteria of the minimum
rewrite of history rule. The antecedent, that is, the absence of elections, is unli-
kely to cause significant ripple effects as it is difficult to imagine how a different
electoral calendar could have affected the international agenda, the constellation
of interstate interests or indeed the national security concerns of the German
government. Neither was the timing of regional elections in any way related to
the timing of elections to the German federal parliament, the Bundestag. It is
therefore highly plausible to assume the same distribution of seats in the Bun-
destag and the same domestic power position of the Merkel government in the
counterfactual as in the factual world.
At the same time, there is no systematic reason which would have made it
improbable that the elections to the state parliaments of Baden-W€urttemberg
and Rhineland-Palatinate had been scheduled differently. Rather, one can point
to a number of plausible mechanisms which could have brought our counterfac-
tuals into being. In the case of Baden-W€urttemberg, for example, a further esca-
lation of a series of massive protests against a local railway project, beginning in
late 2009, would almost certainly have caused a major political crisis and may
well have led to the resignation of the liberal–conservative government and to
snap elections.
Even in the absence of such extraordinary events, both state-level governments
had been free to choose among a range of possible election dates back in early
2010 – specifically they could have selected any Sunday between 20 March and 15
May 2011 in the case of Rhineland-Palatinate or between 20 March and 24 April
2011 in the case of Baden-W€urttemberg. Given the endless contingencies which
might have impacted on these rather low-profile decisions, it appears not at all far-
fetched to regard a different regional electoral calendar as plausible. In any case,
our counterfactuals do not introduce any changes that would have been impossible
in view of inescapable historical facts. This distinguishes our counterfactuals from
Lebow’s example of a miracle world counterfactual (Lebow 2010:44), which imagi-
nes Western Sudan as being inhabited by Caucasians and would thus indeed be a
highly implausible aberration from the course of factual history.
To ensure that our counterfactuals meet the criterion of projectability, more-
over, we need to specify theoretically plausible influences on decision making
that are not connected to electoral considerations. Also, we have to indicate
observable implications of these influences that can be corroborated or dis-
proved by empirical data. In view of established accounts of (post-unification)
German foreign policy, three factors, each located at a different level of analysis
(Waltz 2001), are particularly relevant in this regard:
1. Beliefs and worldviews of decision makers in the foreign policy executive
consisting of the head of government and the departmental ministers
responsible for foreign policy, most notably the foreign minister (Hill
2003:56–62). Such factors have been explored, for example, in research
on the national role conceptions (Maull 2001; Oppermann 2012) and
operational codes (Malici 2006; Brummer 2011) of key members of the
German foreign policy executive, in particular the Chancellor and the
foreign minister.
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2. Intraparty and coalition politics. These variables reflect existing research
on the foreign policy preferences of German political parties (Rinke
2006) and intra-coalition dynamics in foreign policy decision making
(Kaarbo and Lantis 2003).
3. International repercussions of foreign policy decisions and their evalua-
tion by decision makers. This perspective is grounded in the literature
on the Federal Republic’s traditional raison d’etat to establish itself as a
respected and influential partner in Western multilateral political institu-
tions (Besson 1970; Kirchner and Sperling 1992) and the long-standing
priority of German governments not to frustrate the normative expecta-
tions of its major allies in NATO and EU. (Hellmann 2006:97–111)
More specifically, the significance of these potential drivers of German foreign
policy comes from the following considerations: First, if decision makers in the
foreign policy executive responsible for Germany’s approach toward Libya had
previously expressed skepticism about the appropriateness of military interven-
tion under comparable circumstances (except for the electoral politics context)
and if the arguments put forward resemble the justifications given for German
nonparticipation in the case under study, there will be reason to believe that the
latter reflect genuine beliefs and concerns.
Second, intraparty and coalition politics are relevant inasmuch as they reflect
restrictions on Germany’s participation in international military missions which
may have been influential before and during the decision-making process and
which are not necessarily linked to immediate electoral concerns.3 For example,
if significant factions of (one of) the ruling parties had opposed the use of mili-
tary force under circumstances that were similar to our case (except for the elec-
toral calendar) and if they continue to hold these positions at the time of
decision making on Libya, intraparty and coalition politics would emerge as a
plausible driving force behind German nonparticipation.
Third, another possible explanation for German decision making rests on the
anticipated international consequences. These consequences may either have
been misjudged and underestimated or generally dismissed as being of little rele-
vance by decision makers. Evidence to this effect would undermine the case that
the German government have willingly accepted serious international conse-
quences to realize electoral gains and thus reduce the causal weight to be
attached to the electoral politics argument. The following counterfactual case
study discusses how these three potential drivers of decision making would have
affected German policy on Libya in the absence of immediate electoral incen-
tives and which of our competing counterfactual claims they would support.
Germany and NATO’s Military Intervention in Libya
Electoral politics explanations for Germany’s abstention on UN Security Council
Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011 and its nonparticipation in the NATO mission
“Unified Protector” tend to focus on the electoral incentives of the junior partner
to Angela Merkel’s coalition government, the FDP, in the run-up to the regional
elections in Baden-W€urttemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate which were due just 10
days after the UN Security Council vote on Libya. Given the FDP’s extremely poor
showing in opinion polls and the unpopularity of its foreign minister Guido West-
3 It is important to analytically distinguish between broader domestic considerations related to party and coali-
tion politics and more specific and immediate electoral pressures. Although both sets of incentives are ultimately
driven by a concern with government stability and survival, the influence of narrow electoral calculations on deci-
sion-makers depends on the electoral calendar. The further away elections are, the less convincing it is to assume
that decision-making is driven by electoral incentives.
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erwelle, then also still party chairman and vice-chancellor, these elections were
seen as crucial for the political prospects of the FDP and of Westerwelle personally
as well as for the overall stability of the coalition government. What is more,
Guido Westerwelle is credited with having been a leading force in predetermining
the coalition’s approach to Libya and he is seen as having used the authority of
his office to shape Germany’s policy of abstention and nonparticipation as a tacti-
cal electoral ploy to resuscitate his and his party’s political fortunes (R€uhl
2011:564–566; Maull 2012:35–36; Miskimmon 2012:395–396).
Beliefs and Worldviews
Accordingly, the following assessment of the likely trajectory of government deci-
sion making in the absence of imminent elections puts an emphasis on the rele-
vant foreign policy beliefs of Westerwelle. The starting point, here, is that
Westerwelle’s position in the German foreign policy executive and as foreign
minister, vice-chancellor and leader of the junior coalition partner would have
made him as central to government decision making in the counterfactual world
as in the factual world. Moreover, there are three types of empirical evidence
which jointly provide a good indication of the position Westerwelle would likely
have taken on Libya if it had not been for immediate electoral incentives.
The first piece of evidence relates to Westerwelle’s position on the Arab
Spring more broadly, which he has articulated in response to the developments
in Tunisia and Egypt in January and February 2011. This position reveals a deep
skepticism regarding outside intervention into the popular uprisings in the Arab
world. While the foreign minister left no doubt that the German government
“stands unconditionally on the side of democracy – be it in Tunisia, be it in
Egypt” (Westerwelle 2011a:9768), he was also adamant that the uprisings were
ultimately a matter of the Egyptian and Tunisian people and that any impression
had to be avoided that they were “an affair of the West, an affair of foreign gov-
ernments” (Westerwelle 2011b:9964). Whereas Westerwelle took the lead in
drawing up a plan for “swift and targeted economic support” for democracy in
the Middle East (quoted in The Times 2011:8), he insisted that the sovereignty of
Arab societies to take matters into their own hands must not be put into ques-
tion: “We want to help, not to patronize” (Westerwelle 2011b:9964). Perhaps
most pointedly, the foreign minister has expressed his attachment to the princi-
ple of nonintervention into the internal affairs of the Arab countries with regard
to Egypt at a time when it was still in the balance whether the Mubarak regime
would indeed fall: “Who will govern the Egyptian people is not our business, but
it is the business of the Egyptian people itself” (Westerwelle 2011b:9963).4
It was precisely this determination of Westerwelle not to become involved in
the question of President Mubarak’s resignation which earned him a rebuke
from a leading member of the largest German opposition party, the SPD, who
invoked the “responsibility to protect” to challenge the notion that the fate of
the Egyptian uprising can be shrugged off as an internal affair (Wieczorek-Zeul
2011:9974). Although a military intervention in Egypt or Tunisia was never on
the cards, Guido Westerwelle’s well-documented preference for Western non-
interference in the Arab Spring, which he expressed in the absence of any dis-
cernible domestic electoral incentives, suggests that he would have been equally
reluctant to support any military mission to help the Libyan rebels in toppling
the Gaddafi regime in the counterfactual world.
4 The foreign minister essentially took the same position in response to the news of violent clashes between
government and opposition in Bahrain in March 2011: “A solution must be sought within the country itself”
(Westerwelle 2011c:10815).
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Second, the long-standing views of Guido Westerwelle and the FDP on the use
of military force in general further add to the expectation that the foreign minis-
ter would have been no less skeptical about a German contribution to mission
“Unified Protector” under counterfactual conditions. These views are marked, in
particular, by a strong attachment to the Federal Republic’s traditional “culture
of restraint” (Baumann and Hellmann 2001:62–63) in military affairs and, closely
related, by the conviction that military force can only ever be legitimate as a
means of last resort. For example, Westerwelle spelled out the guiding principles
of his foreign policy in a keynote address little more than one year into his term
in office and without any immediate electoral pressures: “Germany will continue
to advocate a culture of restraint with regard to the use of military force. It is
always a weapon of last resort” (Westerwelle 2010).
This position reflects the FDP’s well-established line that “the use of military
means can only be the ultima ratio” (FDP 2009:67) which the party cherishes as
part of the legacy of its highly regarded former foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich
Genscher. While the FDP has clearly not consistently opposed foreign deploy-
ments of the Bundeswehr as a matter of principle, it has long carved out a repu-
tation of endorsing such deployments only in exceptional circumstances under
the condition that it recognizes a strong case that all alternative means have
indeed been exhausted.
This line has also been at the heart of the FDP’s criticism from the opposition
benches of the 2005–2009 CDU/SPD grand coalition under Angela Merkel,
which Westerwelle invoked already early on in the legislative period. Most nota-
bly, he repeatedly accused the coalition of pursuing a “Milit€arangebotspolitik”
(quoted in Frankfurter Rundschau 2006:6), that is, a policy of prematurely offer-
ing German contributions to international military missions. As a case in point,
Westerwelle criticized the CDU’s defense minister at the time, Franz Josef Jung,
for carelessly abandoning the “culture of restraint” when he appeared to suggest
in November 2006 that Germany would stand ready to deploy the Bundeswehr
to Darfur should this become necessary (Welt 2006a:4). More generally,
Westerwelle took issue with what he perceived as a trend toward a less restrained
approach to military options in the German foreign policy discourse:
It is wrong that, by now, the deployment of German armed forces is discussed
already at the beginning of many foreign policy debates. The military is the last,
not the obvious solution. […] The deployment of German soldiers must always
remain the exception […]. In my view, Germany’s power and influence in the
world depend on humanitarian credibility and economic strength – and not on
military presence. (Westerwelle 2006a:5)
As regards the case of Libya, therefore, the foreign minister’s opposition to
any German involvement in a military enforcement of a no-fly zone is consistent
with his and his party’s well-documented skepticism toward foreign deployments
of the Bundeswehr. In particular, Westerwelle’s insistence that the use of military
force should only be considered as a last resource finds its echo in one of the
key reasons given by the foreign minister for Germany’s opposition to mission
“Unified Protector,” which was that a tightening of economic sanctions would
have been a viable and not yet fully exhausted alternative to military means
(Westerwelle 2011d:11137). This argument should thus not be dismissed as an
attempt to dress up electoral considerations, but would likely have been equally
influential in shaping government decision making in the counterfactual world.
The third strand of evidence links back to the opposition of Guido Westerw-
elle and the FDP to Germany’s participation in specific international military
operations under the Merkel-led grand coalition. In particular, the FDP went
against the government decisions to contribute to EUFOR RD Congo, an EU
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mission to assist the UN in providing a secure environment for the holding of
parliamentary and presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(Brummer 2013a), and to lead the maritime efforts of UNIFIL at preventing
arms smuggling into Lebanon (Martinson 2012).5 These decisions were taken in
May and September 2006, respectively, and did not stand in the context of immi-
nent federal or regional elections.6 Although the missions in Congo, Lebanon
and Libya are obviously very different in a number of important respects, includ-
ing their political objectives, military intensity, historical context and institutional
framework, they still have in common that they called for decisions of the Ger-
man government on whether or not to take part in multilateral and UN-man-
dated military interventions which arguably did not implicate any essential or
immediate German security interests.7
What is most revealing, in this regard, is that the arguments which the FDP
invoked against a German contribution to EUFOR RD Congo (Schmitt 2012;
Brummer 2013a) closely mirror some of the main concerns raised by foreign
minister Westerwelle about a military intervention in Libya. Three points, in par-
ticular, stand out.8 One, the FDP in both cases justified its position in terms of
the risks involved for the German armed forces. Just as Westerwelle emphasized
the “incalculable dangers to life and limb of our soldiers” (Westerwelle 2006b:6)
in the debate about the operation in Congo, he warned about the “risks of a
lengthy mission” (quoted in Deutsche Welle 2011) for the German troops in the
case of Libya.
Two, the FDP pointed toward the threats of military escalation inherent in
both interventions. In the case of EUFOR RD Congo, the FDP criticized the
“ambiguities” of the mandate and the lack of an “overall political concept” which
were said to hold the danger of unforeseen spatial and temporal extensions of
the mission (Homburger 2006:3105). A few weeks into the operation, Wester-
welle felt vindicated in his warnings that the intervention would become a
higher-intensity combat mission than expected by the government (Westerwelle
2006c:4505–4506). Along similar lines, one of the core arguments of the foreign
minister against German participation in “Unified Protector” precisely was that a
military intervention to enforce a no-fly zone could prove a “slippery slope”
(Westerwelle 2011e:10816) toward the deployment of ground troops which
would make the Bundeswehr “a party in a civil war” (Westerwelle 2011e:10815).
Three, the FDP substantiated its opposition to the two military interventions
by questioning their prospects of success. As regards the Congo, the liberals
“doubted the sustainability of the effects” (Hoyer 2006a:3239) of the mission:
5 It must be noted, however, that the FDP voted in favor of continuing the Bundeswehr’s participation in UNI-
FIL after it joined the government in 2009. This change of course was facilitated by the fact that the mission pro-
ceeded without any major incidence and that the initial concerns of the FDP did thus not materialize.
6 In 2007, the FDP also argued against a German participation in operation EUFOR Chad/RCA, an EU military
mission in Chad and the Central African Republic which took place in 2008/2009. This mission, however, was
hardly discussed in Germany at all, because the grand coalition made it clear early on that there would be no Ger-
man military contribution to it (Schmitt 2012:72–76).
7 This is not to claim that the FDP has opposed all decisions of the 2005–2009 grand coalition to participate in
international military missions. In particular, it has voted in favor of Germany’s contributions to UNAMID in
November 2007 and EU NAVFOR ATALANTA in December 2008. The decisions to participate in these operations
in Darfur and at the Horn of Africa were both essentially uncontested in the German political debate (Brummer
2013b:153–182, 205–244). Rather, the argument is that the cases of EUFOR RD Congo and UNIFIL make for
recent precedents in which the FDP has opposed international military missions in the absence of immediate elec-
toral pressures. This serves to reinforce the point that electoral incentives should not be seen as an indispensable
prerequisite for the FDP to speak out against foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr.
8 In addition, the FDP linked its rejection of EUFOR RD Congo to its general concern with using military force
only as the ultima ratio: “Perhaps we have already become too accustomed, in critical situations, to resort to the
instrument of Bundeswehr deployments when it comes to supporting peacekeeping missions across the globe. How-
ever, what seems to disappear from view occasionally, is that deployments of the armed forces, in particular of the
German armed forces, can only always be the very last means” (Hoyer 2006a:3238).
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It is inconceivable that a country which is bigger than Western Europe can be
stabilized with 500 German troops and maybe another 1000 soldiers from other
European countries. (Westerwelle 2006b:6)
With respect to mission “Unified Protector,” in turn, the foreign minister
expressed doubts that a no-fly zone can be effective “in a country like Libya […]
which is approximately four times bigger than the Federal Republic of Germany”
and raised the possibility that the intervention may “weaken rather than
strengthen the democratic movements across North Africa” (Westerwelle
2011e:10815).
Moving on to Germany’s contribution to UNIFIL off the Lebanese coast, the
domestic debate about this mission was set apart from the debates about other
military interventions by the exceptionally prominent role of different interpreta-
tions of the lessons to be learned from German history (Martinson 2012:401–
403). Correspondingly, the FDP and Guido Westerwelle also explained their
opposition against the government decision to participate in the operation pri-
marily in historical terms:
I personally have very fundamental historical objections to a deployment of Ger-
man soldiers to the Middle East. […] [We] should keep to the reasons of state
which have so far been accepted in Germany: no German armed forces in the
Middle East. (Westerwelle 2006c:4506)
At the same time, the FDP complemented its case against Germany’s contri-
bution to UNIFIL with concerns about a possible military escalation of the
intervention, which fits into the party’s reasoning in the Congo and Libya
cases. Thus, the FDP objected to the “ambiguity of the [United Nations] man-
date” (Westerwelle 2006c:4506) and the lack of a clear “political concept,”
(Gerhardt 2006:825) which were seen to leave crucial questions on the practi-
cal implementation of the mission open and which would therefore hold the
danger that the Bundeswehr becomes ever more drawn into the conflict as “a
kind of war party” (Westerwelle 2006c:4506). For the FDP, UNIFIL was an
“even bigger military adventure” (Niebel 2006:5) than EUFOR RD Congo, a
participation in which would risk being counterproductive in that it may
undermine Germany’s political contributions to a resolution of the conflict
(Hoyer 2006b:4802).
All things considered, the evidence on Guido Westerwelle’s foreign policy
beliefs suggest that the foreign minister would have essentially taken the same
line against operation “Unified Protector” in the counterfactual world as he
indeed did in the factual world. As these beliefs reflect long-standing party policy
and have been shared by the broader leadership of the FDP, the intraparty bal-
ance of opinion further reinforces the expectation that the junior coalition part-
ner would also have pressed for a policy of nonparticipation in the case of Libya,
if it had not been for the upcoming regional elections.
Intraparty and Coalition Politics
As regards intraparty politics, the evidence suggests that the counterfactual
world, like the factual world, would not have seen significant pressures from
within the FDP on the party leadership around foreign minister Westerwelle to
support a military intervention in Libya.9 First, as we argue above, it has been
9 We acknowledge, however, that it is always likely to be difficult to prove a negative. Also, a more comprehen-
sive account of the intraparty dimension which would have required analyzing in more depth the views of the FDP
grassroots on the use of military force and the German response to the Arab Spring is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle.
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the long-standing policy of the FDP, which was confirmed at various party con-
ferences in the past, to be skeptical toward the use of military force and to see it
only as a means of last resort. Unlike, for example, recent intraparty debates on
European policy (Oppermann 2012:511), there has been no public contestation
of this line from within the FDP. Second, neither Westerwelle’s broader stance
on the Arab Spring nor the decisions of the party leadership to oppose military
operations like EUFOR RD Congo or UNIFIL did provoke open dissent in the
relevant Bundestag debates from speakers of the FDP (Deutscher Bundestag
2011:9963–9978; Deutscher Bundestag 2006a:3236–3261; Deutscher Bundestag
2006b:4845–4848).
Moreover, what is worth noting about the factual world is that the FDP’s regio-
nal party organizations in Baden-W€urttemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate hardly
ever made use of the Libya issue during their election campaigns. As a case in
point, on March 23, 2011, a few days before the elections, the official homepage
of the FDP Baden-W€urttemberg only mentioned the issue under the heading
“news from the national party” alongside a diverse selection of other national
issues.10 What is more, a LexisNexis search of German newspapers did not bring
up a single reference to Libya of one of the FDP’s top candidates in Baden-
W€urttemberg or Rhineland-Palatinate.11 This serves to reinforce our point that
intraparty constraints on FDP policy toward Libya would essentially have been
the same under counterfactual conditions as in the factual world.
Moving on to coalition politics, there is similarly nothing to suggest that the
senior coalition party, the CDU, would have challenged its junior partner’s posi-
tion on Libya any more in the counterfactual than in the factual world. Thus, we
would expect the same extent of intra-coalition consensus against German sup-
port for mission ‘Unified Protector’ under both conditions (Rinke 2011:51–52).
First, Chancellor Merkel’s preoccupation with managing the Eurozone crisis and
the government’s nuclear policy turn-around after the Fukushima disaster would
have made her no less prepared to leave the lead over decision making on Libya
to the foreign office and to Guido Westerwelle in the absence of forthcoming
regional elections. In fact, it is difficult to see why Merkel should have run the
risk of further destabilizing the coalition by going against her junior partner on
an issue which was not her top priority and which was within the jurisdiction of
the foreign minister. Rather, concerns with the stability and survival of the gov-
ernment would have provided a strong domestic political imperative for the
CDU not to contest the FDP line on Libya that is irrespective of and distinct
from immediate electoral incentives.
Second, the policy of nonparticipation on Libya fits into the broader thrust of
reforms of the Bundeswehr, which both coalition partners had agreed to already
in their 2009 coalition treaty (CDU/CSU and FDP 2009:123–125). These reforms
were driven, more than anything, by the imperatives of budgetary consolidation
and imply a scaled-down ambition for the Bundeswehr in “out-of-area” missions
as well as a renewed focus of the German armed forces on multilateral territorial
defense (Miskimmon 2012:400). Along these lines, the two coalition partners
share a long-standing concern with avoiding an overload of the Bundeswehr, in
particular, given Germany’s ongoing military engagement in Afghanistan. For
example, this point has been invoked by the CDU’s defense minister at the time,
Thomas de Maiziere, to explain Germany’s rather small-scale support for
10 See http://web.archive.org/web/20110323135334/http://fdp-bw.de/home.php (accessed: 22 November
2013).
11 Our full-text search included all articles in the category “German Press” between 1 January, 2011 and elec-
tion day on 27 March, 2011. The search identified a total number of 18 articles which included both references to
“Libya” and the names of at least one of the FDP’s top candidates in the two regional elections. None of the arti-
cles, however, referred to any statements of the FDP candidates themselves about Libya or Germany’s abstention in
the UN Security Council.
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France’s UN-backed military intervention in Mali (De Maiziere 2013).12 Again,
this concern should have been as relevant for government decision making on
Libya under counterfactual conditions as in the factual world.
Third, it is important to reiterate that the “electoral politics” explanation of
Germany’s policy on Libya primarily focuses on the electoral incentives of the
FDP, not the CDU. On the narrow terms of testing this hypothesis, the counter-
factual manipulation of taking electoral incentives out of the equation should
thus leave the position of the CDU and of Angela Merkel unaffected. All this
suggests that key representatives of the senior coalition partner, most notably
Chancellor Merkel and defense minister de Maiziere, would also have shared
Westerwelle’s objections against mission “Unified Protector” if it had not been
for any regional elections. Thus, Angela Merkel’s assessment of possible mea-
sures against the Gaddafi regime should have been no less valid in the counter-
factual world:
I am sceptical towards a military intervention, however. As Chancellor, I cannot
lead us into a mission with highly uncertain prospects. (Merkel 2011)
Anticipated International Repercussions
Finally, an assessment of Germany’s likely approach to Libya under counterfactual
conditions has to consider the government’s calculation of the possible conse-
quences of German nonparticipation on the international level. This is important,
in particular, because the “electoral politics” account of the Merkel government’s
policy rests on the view that decision makers traded off significant international
costs regarding Germany’s standing with its Western allies against hoped-for elec-
toral benefits. Absent the promise of electoral gains, therefore, the anticipated
international repercussions of its policy should have made the German govern-
ment more inclined toward contributing to the intervention in the counterfactual
world. However, two observations appear to contradict this corollary of arguments
stressing the role of electoral incentives in government decision making.
First, there is evidence that the German government did not initially expect
significant international costs from its nonparticipation in the intervention and
that international incentives should thus not have exerted a clear-cut pull toward
a German contribution to the mission under counterfactual conditions. In par-
ticular, the reluctance of the US to unequivocally come out in favor of the inter-
vention as well as apparent pointers to the effect that France and the UK would
not be overly critical if Germany did not support Resolution 1973 and stood
apart from its military implementation should have diluted the perceived pres-
sure on the German government to take a more positive stance on the issue irre-
spective of any electoral considerations (Miskimmon 2012:398). Given that more
than half of NATO member states, including Poland and other EU countries,
did not make a military contribution to the intervention either, moreover, the
Merkel government arguably had some reason for thinking that it was not iso-
lated on Libya (Deutsche Welle 2011). Indeed, there was some discussion in
public discourse during the early days of “Unified Protector” about the UK and
France, not Germany, being increasingly isolated on this issue within NATO (The
Guardian 2011).
Second, the broader trajectory of an increasingly self-confident foreign policy
of post-unification Germany (Hellmann et al. 2007) would suggest that concerns
with its reputation in the Western alliance were not uppermost on the Merkel
12 The then-defense minister of the CDU, Franz Josef Jung, already warned about the risk of overstretching the
capabilities of the Bundeswehr in the context of the debate about EUFOR RD Congo (Schmitt 2012:67). The FDP,
then in opposition, also bolstered its case against a German contribution to that mission by making a similar case:
“[T]he capacities of the Bundeswehr are fully exhausted” (Niebel 2006:5).
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government’s list of priorities.13 In what has been described as being part of the
“normalization” of German foreign policy (Oppermann 2012:506–507), govern-
ment decisions on the use of military force are increasingly framed in terms of
explicit national interests and have become altogether less driven by a preoccu-
pation with meeting the expectations of the Federal Republic’s partners than
has traditionally been the case. The implication for the counterfactual world,
therefore, is that possible anticipated repercussions of the policy on Libya for
Germany’s standing in the alliance, very much like in the factual world, would
not have carried very much weight with decision makers and would therefore
not have exerted strong pressure toward German participation in the military
intervention (Hellmann 2011).
Most notably, this changed mindset of German foreign policy decision makers
has long been evident for foreign minister Westerwelle and the FDP more
broadly. Thus, Guido Westerwelle already in the debate about EUFOR RD
Congo left no doubt that decisions on Germany’s participation in military mis-
sions must not be overly subservient to the wishes of its international partners:
Paris calls, Berlin follows – commitments to foreign deployments [of the Bundes-
wehr] must not follow this pattern. (Westerwelle quoted in Welt 2006b:1)
Rather, the FDP has insisted, for example in the UNIFIL debate, that German
contributions to military missions must follow, in the words of the party’s general
secretary at the time, “our own political interests” (Niebel 2006:5). The very point
that there were no German interests involved, moreover, was also a key argument
put forward by the grand coalition under Angela Merkel against offering German
troops for EUFOR Chad/RCA (Schmitt 2012:74–75). The 2009–2013 conservative-
liberal government, in turn, has explicitly laid down the principle that foreign
deployments of the Bundeswehr must always be justifiable in terms of German
security interests in its Defense Policy Guidelines which were published two
months after the decision not to participate in mission “Unified Protector”:
Military operations have far-reaching political consequences. In each individual
case, there must be a clear answer to the question of whether German interests
and the related fulfillment of international responsibility require and justify an
operation and what the consequences of nonaction would be. (German Ministry
of Defence 2011:4)
By the same token, the Merkel government has put a strong emphasis on the
German national interest in explaining its policy of nonparticipation on Libya.
Comparing Afghanistan and Libya, Chancellor Merkel, for example, has argued
that while the Bundeswehr involvement in Afghanistan contributes to German
security, the same could not be said for Libya (Merkel 2011). If anything,
defense minister de Maiziere was even more explicit in making the same point:
The international community says: [in Libya] can be intervened. And we reserve
the right, in the German interest, to say: we will not be involved this time. […]
We are not convinced of this military operation. (quoted in Handelsblatt 2011)
The interest-based justifications of government policy on Libya in the factual
world are thus very much in line with similar policy statements of key decision
makers in the foreign policy executive in different contexts and reflect a broader
13 This is not to say that the coalition was indifferent to the possible loss of international prestige in conse-
quence of its stance on Libya. It is only that the government did not let the anticipation of such costs drive its pol-
icy on the intervention. Rather, it made an effort to make good for any damage to its international reputation by
offering up to 300 more troops for AWACS reconnaissance flights over Afghanistan in order to reduce the burden
on NATO-partners who are engaged in Libya and to send “a political signal of alliance solidarity” (De Maiziere
2011:11182).
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trend in post-unification German foreign policy. This would suggest, in turn,
that the case made by the government against the intervention in Libya was not
only an electoral ploy but would also have figured in the counterfactual world.
In summary, the counterfactual analysis suggests that the Merkel government
would have pursued essentially the same policy of nonparticipation on mission
“Unified Protector” even if it had not been for any immediate electoral incen-
tives. Foreign minister Westerwelle’s prominent role in coalition decision making
on this issue and his long-standing foreign policy beliefs, which have been
shared by other key representatives of the FDP, would have strongly pushed gov-
ernment policy in this direction and there would not have been serious chal-
lenges to such a course on the level of intraparty and coalition politics or as
regards the anticipated international costs of the policy.
It is important to note, however, that this finding does not in itself speak to
the much debated – and at times recommended – option of voting in favor of
Resolution 1973 in the Security Council without participating in its military
implementation (Bertram 2011). The government rejected this option primarily
on the grounds that it was said to be inconsistent and unsustainable. Specifically,
both the Chancellor and the foreign minister argued that endorsing the resolu-
tion at the UN would have put Germany under increasing international pressure
to offer a military contribution as well, ultimately making the policy of nonpartic-
ipation in the intervention impossible to uphold (R€uhl 2011:565–566; Wester-
welle 2011e:2).
Although the evidence in this regard is sketchy, the above analysis still gives
two reasons to expect that the government would also have refrained from de-
coupling its vote in the Security Council from the question of a military contri-
bution to “Unified Protector” in the counterfactual world. First, such a policy
appears out of sync with the notion of an increased self-confidence of German
foreign policy which would have left the Merkel government as predisposed to
making a vocal case against the political rationale behind Resolution 1973
instead of quietly acquiescing in it under counterfactual conditions as it was in
the factual world (Miskimmon 2012:395). Second, the government’s calculation
of the international repercussions of its policy would in neither of the two sce-
narios have strongly pushed decision makers toward voting in favor of Resolution
1973. Rather, the coalition proceeded on the assumption that an abstention only
had serious consequences for its reputation within the Alliance, if Germany
would thereby bring down the resolution. Had this been the case, however, the
evidence is that the Merkel government would have voted with its allies regard-
less of the forthcoming regional elections (Rinke 2011:52).
Conclusion
The article has set out to scrutinize “electoral politics” explanations of German
nonparticipation in the 2011 military intervention in Libya. While scholars have
provided many different accounts of what made the Merkel government oppose
military action in this case, one prominent argument is that decision making was
shaped by the electoral incentives of the government to play to the gallery of an
anti-interventionist public opinion in the face of forthcoming regional elections.
However, such an argument is inherently difficult to test or falsify using tradi-
tional case study methods. At the same time, it implicitly rests on the assumption
that government policy would have been different had decision making not
taken place in the context of an imminent election. Making this assumption
explicit and testing it in a comparative counterfactual analysis has therefore been
judged a promising methodological tool to tease out the extent to which elec-
toral considerations have indeed made a difference to Germany’s approach to
the Libya issue.
MISCHA HANSEL AND KAI OPPERMANN 15
Specifically, the article has constructed two counterfactuals in which decision
making on whether to contribute to NATO’s intervention did not take place in
the context of imminent elections. The research strategy has then been to inves-
tigate how different possible explanatory factors in the theoretical toolbox of for-
eign policy analysis (FPA) on different levels of analysis would have played out
in the absence of electoral incentives. Thus, the article has looked at three fac-
tors that figure prominently in the debate about Germany’s foreign policy since
unification: the beliefs of decision makers; intraparty and coalition politics; and
the anticipated international repercussions of government decisions.
The main contention of our case study is that German foreign policy would
not have been different even if the government had not made its decision in the
shadow of forthcoming elections. It was above all the beliefs and influence of
foreign minister Guido Westerwelle and the position of the junior coalition part-
ner more broadly which would also have suggested a German policy of nonpar-
ticipation in the counterfactual world. The dynamics of intraparty and coalition
politics and the Merkel government’s assessment of the international conse-
quences of its policy further reinforce this expectation.
In the final analysis, therefore, our counterfactual manipulations lead us to
conclude that electoral incentives did not have causal influence on the decision
of the Merkel government to oppose the military intervention in Libya. “Elec-
toral politics” explanations of this case of German nonparticipation in an inter-
national military mission are thus ultimately unconvincing. This provides a
fruitful point of departure for future research which should engage in systematic
tests of competing theoretical accounts of German foreign policy on Libya as
well as the use of military force more generally. On a broader level, the article
suggests that counterfactuals open up a promising route in FPA toward assessing
the relative weight of single explanatory variables in the multi-factorial explana-
tions of foreign policy decision making which are one of the hallmarks of the
discipline (Hudson 2007:6).
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